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We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each
type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced by the
principal’s limited verification power. We prove hardness results when the revelation principle
does not necessarily hold, as well as when types have even minimally different preferences. In
light of these hardness results, we focus on truthful mechanisms in the setting where all types
share the same preference over outcomes, which is motivated by applications in, e.g., strategic
classification. We present a number of algorithmic and structural results, including an efficient
algorithm for finding optimal deterministic truthful mechanisms, which also implies a faster
algorithm for finding optimal randomized truthful mechanisms via a characterization based on
convexity. We then consider a more general setting, where the principal’s cost is a function of
the combination of outcomes assigned to each type. In particular, we focus on the case where
the cost function is submodular, and give generalizations of essentially all our results in the
classical setting where the cost function is additive. Our results provide a relatively complete
picture for automated mechanism design with partial verification.
1 Introduction
Agents are often classified into a variety of categories, some more desirable than others. Loan
applicants might be classified in various categories of risk, determining the interest they would
have to pay. University applicants may be classified into categories such as “rejected,” “wait list,”
“regular accept,” and “accept with honors scholarship.” Meanwhile universities might themselves
be classified into categories such as “most competitive,” “highly competitive,” etc. In line with the
language of mechanism design (often considered part of game theory), we assume that each agent
(i.e., the entity being classified) has a type, corresponding to the agent’s true financial situation,
ability as a student, or competitiveness as a university. This type is information that is private
to the agent. In most applications of mechanism design, the type encodes the agent’s preferences.
For example, in an auction, an agent’s type is how much he values the outcome where he wins
the auction. In contrast, in our setting, the type does not encode the agent’s preferences: in the
examples above, typically any agent has the same preferences over outcomes, regardless of the
agent’s true type. Instead, the type is relevant to the objective function of the principal (the entity
























Often, in mechanism design, it is assumed that an agent of any type can report any other type
(e.g., bid any value in an auction), and outcomes are based on these reports. Under this assumption,
our problem would be hopeless: every agent would always simply report whatever type gives the
most favorable outcome, so we could not at all distinguish agents based on their true type. But in
our context this assumption is not sensible: while an agent may be able to take some actions that
affect how its financial situation appears, it will generally not be possible for a person in significant
debt and without a job to successfully imitate a wealthy person with a secure career. This brings
us into the less commonly studied domain of mechanism design with partial verification [Green and
Laffont, 1986, Yu, 2011], in which not every type can misreport every other type. That is, each
type has certain other types that it can misreport. A standard example in this literature is that it
is possible to have arrived later than one really did, but not possible to have arrived earlier. (In
that case, the arrival time is the type.) In this paper, however, we are interested in more complex
misreporting (in)abilities.
What determines which types can misreport (i.e., successfully imitate) which other types? This
is generally specific to the setting at hand. Zhang et al. [2019b] consider settings in which different
types produce “samples” (e.g., timely payments, grades, admissions rates, ...) according to different
distributions. They characterize which types can distinguish themselves from which other types in
the long run, in a model in which agents can either (1) manipulate these samples before they are
submitted to the principal, by either withholding transforming some of them in limited ways, or
(2) choose the number of costly samples to generate [Zhang et al., 2019b,a, 2021]. In this paper,
we will take as given which types can misreport which other types; this relation may result from
applying the above characterization result, or from some other model.
Our goal is: given the misreporting relation, agents’ preferences, and the principal’s objective,
can we efficiently compute the optimal (single-agent) mechanism/classifier, which assigns each
report to an outcome/class? This is a problem in automated mechanism design [Conitzer and
Sandholm, 2002, 2004], where the goal is to compute the optimal mechanism for the specific setting
(outcome space, utility and objective functions, type distribution, ...) at hand. Quite a bit is
already known about the complexity of the automated mechanism design problem, and with partial
verification, the problem is known to become even harder [Auletta et al., 2011, Yu, 2011, Kephart
and Conitzer, 2015, 2016]. The structural advantage that we have here is that, unlike that earlier
work, we are considering settings where all types have the same preferences over outcomes. This
allows us positive results that would otherwise not be available.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
Throughout the paper, we assume agents have utility functions which they seek to maximize, and
the principal has a cost function which she seeks to minimize.
General vs. truthful mechanisms. We first set out to investigate the problem of automated
mechanism design with partial verification in the most general sense, where there is no restriction
on each type’s utility function. In light of previously known hardness results, although the most
general problem is unlikely to be efficiently solvable, one may still hope to identify maximally
nontrivial special cases for which efficient algorithms exist. In order to determine the boundary of
tractability, our first finding, Theorem 1, shows that when the revelation principle does not hold,
it is NP-hard to find an optimal (randomized or deterministic) mechanism even if (1) there are
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only 2 outcomes and (2) all types share the same utility function.1 In other words, without the
revelation principle, no efficient algorithm exists even for the minimally nontrivial setting. We
therefore focus our attention on cases where the revelation principle holds, or, put in another way,
on finding optimal truthful mechanisms.
General vs. structured utility functions. The above result, as well as prior results on mech-
anism design with partial verification [Auletta et al., 2011, Yu, 2011, Kephart and Conitzer, 2015,
2016], paints a clear picture of intractability when the revelation principle does not hold. But prior
work also often suggests that this is indeed the boundary of tractability. This is in fact true if we
consider optimal randomized truthful mechanisms, which can be found by solving a linear program
with polynomially many variables and constraints if the number of agents is constant [Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2002]. However, as our second finding (Theorem 2) shows, the case of determin-
istic mechanisms is totally different — even with 3 outcomes and single-peaked preferences over
outcomes, it is still NP-hard to find an optimal deterministic truthful mechanism (significantly im-
proving over earlier hardness results for deterministic mechanisms [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002,
2004]). In other words, optimal deterministic truthful mechanisms are almost always hard to find
whenever types have different preferences over outcomes. This leads us to what appears to be the
only nontrivial case left, i.e., where all types share the same preference over outcomes. But this
case is important: as discussed above, it in fact nicely captures a number of real-world scenarios of
practical importance, and will be the focus in the rest of our results.
Efficient algorithm for deterministic mechanisms. Our first algorithmic result (Theorem 3)
is an efficient algorithm for finding optimal deterministic truthful mechanisms with identical prefer-
ences in the presence of partial verification. The algorithm works by building a directed capacitated
graph, where each deterministic truthful mechanism corresponds bijectively to a finite-capacity s-t
cut. The algorithm then finds an s-t min-cut in polynomial time, which corresponds to a deter-
ministic truthful mechanism with the minimum cost.
Condition for deterministic optimality and faster algorithm for randomized mecha-
nisms. We then consider randomized mechanisms. We aim to answer the following two natural
questions.
• In which cases is there a gap between optimal deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and
how large can this gap be?
• While LP formulations exist for optimal randomized truthful mechanisms in general, is it possible
to design theoretically and/or practically faster algorithms when types share the same utility
function?
The answers to these questions turn out to be closely related.
For the first question, we show that the gap in general can be arbitrarily large (Example 1). On
the other hand, there always exists an optimal truthful mechanism that is deterministic whenever
the principal’s cost function is convex with respect to the common utility function (Lemma 1).
In order to prove this, we show that without loss of generality, an optimal truthful mechanism
randomizes only between two consecutive outcomes (when sorted by utility) for each type, and
1The revelation principle states that if certain conditions hold on the reporting structure, then it is without loss
of generality to focus on truthful mechanisms, in which agents are always best off revealing their true type. We will
discuss below a necessary and sufficient condition for the revelation principle to hold in our setting.
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present a way to round any such mechanism into a deterministic truthful mechanism, preserving
the cost in expectation.
For the second question, we give a positive answer, by observing that with randomization, es-
sentially only the convex envelope of the principal’s cost function matters. This implies a reduction
from finding optimal randomized mechanisms with general costs, to finding optimal randomized
mechanisms with convex costs, and – via our answer to the first question (Lemma 1) – to finding op-
timal deterministic mechanisms with convex costs. As a result, finding optimal randomized truthful
mechanisms is never harder than finding optimal deterministic truthful mechanisms with convex
costs. Combined with our algorithm for the latter problem (Theorem 3), this reduction implies a
theoretically and practically faster algorithm for finding optimal randomized truthful mechanisms
when types share the same utility function.
Generalizing to combinatorial costs. With all the intuition developed so far, we then proceed
to a significantly more general setting, where the principal’s cost is a function of the combination
of outcomes for each type, i.e., the principal’s cost function is combinatorial. This further captures
global constraints for the principal, e.g., budget or headcount constraints. We present combinatorial
counterparts of essentially all our results for additive costs in Section 3.
1.2 Further Related Work
Some recent research along the line of automated mechanism design includes designing auctions
from observed samples [Cole and Roughgarden, 2014, Devanur et al., 2016, Balcan et al., 2018,
Gonczarowski and Weinberg, 2018], mechanism design via deep learning [Duetting et al., 2019,
Shen et al., 2019], and estimating incentive compatibility [Balcan et al., 2019]. Most of these
results focus on auctions, while in this paper, we consider automated mechanism design in a more
general sense (though we focus mostly on the types of setting discussed in the introduction, which
have more of a classification focus). More closely related are results on automated mechanism
design with partial verification [Auletta et al., 2011, Yu, 2011, Kephart and Conitzer, 2015, 2016].
Those results are about conditions under which the revelation principle holds (including a relevant
condition to our setting discussed later), and the computational complexity of deciding whether
there exists an implementation of a specific mapping from types to outcomes. On the other hand,
we focus on algorithms for designing cost-optimal truthful mechanisms, which is largely orthogonal
to those results.
Another closely related line of research is strategic machine learning. There, a common assump-
tion is that utility-maximizing agents can modify their features in some restricted way, normally
at some cost [Hardt et al., 2016, Kleinberg and Raghavan, 2019, Haghtalab et al., 2020, Zhang and
Conitzer, 2021] (see also [Kephart and Conitzer, 2015, 2016]). Strategic aspects of linear regression
have also been studied [Perote and Perote-Pena, 2004, Dekel et al., 2010, Chen et al., 2018]. Our
results differ from the above in that we study strategic classification from a more general point of
view, and do not put restrictions on the class of classifiers or learning algorithms to be used.
Another line of work in economics considers mechanism design with costly misreporting, where
the cost is unobservable to the principal [Laffont and Tirole, 1986, McAfee and McMillan, 1987].
These results are incomparable with ours, since they consider rather specific models, while we
consider utility and cost functions of essentially any form.
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2 Additive Cost over Types
Consider the classical setting of Bayesian (single-agent) mechanism design, which is as follows. The
agent can have one of many possible types. The agent reports a type to the principal (which may
not be his true type), and then the principal chooses an outcome. The principal does not know
the type of the agent, but she has a prior probability distribution over the agent’s possible types.
The principal has a different cost for each combination of a type and an outcome. The goal of the
principal is to design a mechanism (a mapping from reports to outcomes) to minimize her expected
cost assuming the agent best-responds to (i.e., maximizes his utility under) the mechanism. The
principal aims to minimize her total cost over this population of agents, which is equal to the sum
of her cost over individual agents.
In this section, we focus on the traditional setting where the principal’s cost is additive over
types. In Section 3, we generalize our results to broader settings where the principal’s cost function
can be combinatorial (e.g., submodular) over types.
Notation. Let Θ be the agent’s type space, and O the set of outcomes. Let n = |Θ| and m = |O|
be the numbers of types and outcomes respective. Generally, we use i ∈ Θ to index types, and
j ∈ O to index outcomes. Let R+ = [0,∞). We use ui : O → R+ to denote the utility of a type
i agent, and ci : O → R+ to denote the cost of the principal of assigning different outcomes to a
type i agent.
Let R ⊆ Θ×Θ denote all possible ways of misreporting, that is, a type i agent can report type
i′ if and only if (i, i′) ∈ R. We assume each type i can always report truthfully, i.e., (i, i) ∈ R. The
principal specifies a (possibly randomized) mechanism M : Θ→ O, which maps reported types to
(distributions over) outcomes. The agent then responds to maximize his expected utility under M .
Let ri denote the report of type i when the agent best responds:
ri ∈ argmaxi′∈Θ,(i,i′)∈R E[ui(M(i′))].
Without loss of generality, the principal’s cost function can be scaled so that the prior distribution





E [ci (M (ri))]
where both expectations are over the randomness in M . Throughout the paper, given a set S, we
use ∆(S) to denote the set of all distributions over S.
2.1 Hardness without the Revelation Principle
The well-known revelation principle states that when any type can report any other type, there
always exists a truthful direct-revelation mechanism that is optimal for the principal.2 However,
this is not true in the case of partial verification (see, e.g., [Green and Laffont, 1986, Yu, 2011,
Kephart and Conitzer, 2016]). In fact, it is known (see Theorem 4.10 of [Kephart and Conitzer,
2016]) that in our setting, the revelation principle holds if and only if the reporting structure R is
2A direct-revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which agents can only report their type, rather than sending
arbitrary messages. A mechanism is truthful if it is always optimal for agents to report their true types.
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transitive, i.e., for any types i1, i2, i3 ∈ Θ,
(i1, i2) ∈ R and (i2, i3) ∈ R =⇒ (i1, i3) ∈ R.3
We begin our investigation by presenting a hardness result, which states that when the revelation
principle does not hold, it is NP-hard to find any optimal mechanism (even in the minimal nontrivial
setting).
Theorem 1 (NP-hardness without the Revelation Principle). When partial verification is allowed
and the revelation principle does not hold, it is NP-hard to find an optimal (randomized or de-
terministic) mechanism, even if there are only 2 outcomes and all types share the same utility
function.
We postpone the proof of Theorem 1, as well as all other proofs in this section, to Appendix C.
In light of Theorem 1, in the rest of the paper, we focus on finding optimal truthful direct-revelation
mechanisms. That is, we consider only mechanisms M where for any (i1, i2) ∈ R,
E[ui1(M(i1))] ≥ E[ui1(M(i2))].
2.2 General vs. Structured Utility Functions
Following the convention in the literature, we assume agents always break ties by reporting truth-






Our first finding establishes a dichotomy between deterministic and randomized mechanisms when
agents can have arbitrary utility functions. On one hand, it is known that an optimal randomized
mechanism can be found in polynomial time by formulating the problem as a linear program
[Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002]. On the other hand, finding an optimal deterministic mechanism is
NP-hard even in an extremely simple setting as described below.
Theorem 2 (NP-hardness with General Utility Functions). When partial verification is allowed,
even when the revelation principle holds, it is NP-hard to find an optimal deterministic mechanism,
even if there are only 3 outcomes and the utility functions are single-peaked (see Appendix B.1 for
a definition).
Although Theorem 2 establishes hardness for finding optimal deterministic mechanisms in most
nontrivial cases, it leaves the possibility of efficient algorithms when all types have the same utility
function — which, as discussed in the introduction, is the setting we focus on in this paper.
3To get some intuition for this characterization, suppose that (i1, i2) ∈ R, (i2, i3) ∈ R, but (i1, i3) /∈ R, and we
would like to accept i2 and i3 but not i1. That is, higher types are better, and each type (except for the top one) can
make itself look a bit, but not much, better than it is. There is no truthful mechanism that achieves what we want:
if we accept a report of i2, we will end up accepting i1 as well because it can misreport i2. On the other hand, if we
accept only i3, then we get what we want, by relying on i2 to non-truthfully report i3 (whereas i1 cannot). Hence,
our goal can be achieved in a non-truthful implementation while it cannot be achieved in a truthful implementation,
showing that the revelation principle does not hold in this case.
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2.3 Finding Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms
In light of the previously mentioned hardness results, for the rest of this section, we focus on the
setting where the revelation principle holds and all types have the same utility function.
We recall and simplify some notations before we state the main result of this section (Theo-
rem 3). Let u : O → R+ be the common utility function of all types. Recall that n = |Θ| is the
number of types and m = |O| is the number of outcomes. Let Θ = [n] = {1, . . . , n}. For brevity,
we use O = {o1, . . . , om} ⊆ R+ to encode the utility function u. That is, for all j ∈ [m], oj ∈ R+
is the utility of the agent under the j-th outcome. Without loss of generality, assume o1 = 0, and
oj < oj+1 for all j ∈ [m− 1].
We give an efficient algorithm (Algorithm 1) for finding an optimal deterministic mechanism
when partial verification is allowed.4 Our algorithm first builds a (capacitated) directed graph
based on the principal’s cost function and the reporting structure, then finds an s-t min-cut in the
graph, and then constructs a mechanism based on the found min-cut. The idea is finite-capacity
cuts in the graph constructed correspond bijectively to truthful mechanisms, where the capacity is
precisely the cost of the principal. In particular, we use edges with ∞ capacity to ensure that if
one type gets an outcome, any type that can misreport the former must get at least as good an
outcome. See Figure 1 for an illustration of Algorithm 1. The following theorem establishes the
correctness and time complexity of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3 (Fast Algorithm for Finding Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms). Suppose for any i ∈
[n] and j ∈ [m], ci(oj) ∈ N. Let W = maxi,j ci(oj). Algorithm 1 outputs an optimal deterministic
truthful mechanism in time O(TMinCut(mn,mn
2,W )), where TMinCut(n
′,m′,W ′) is the time it takes
to find an s-t min-cut in a graph with n′ vertices, m′ edges, and maximum capacity W ′.
We note that Algorithm 1 only finds an optimal deterministic mechanism subject to truthfulness
— when the revelation principle does not hold, Algorithm 1 may not find an unconditionally optimal
mechanism (and indeed finding that is NP-hard given Theorem 1). The same applies for all our
algorithmic results.
2.4 Optimality of Deterministic Mechanisms with Convex Costs
In the previous subsection, we showed that when the revelation principle holds and all types have
the same utility function, there is a min-cut-based algorithm (Algorithm 1) that finds an optimal
deterministic truthful mechanism.
In this subsection, we identify an important special case where there exists an optimal truthful
mechanism that is deterministic (even when randomized mechanisms are allowed). Consequently,
we have an algorithm (Algorithm 1) for finding the optimal truthful mechanism that runs faster
than solving a linear program. More importantly, as we will show in Section 2.5, we can essentially
reduce the general case to this special case, and consequently obtain an algorithm for computing
the optimal truthful mechanism whose runtime is asymptotically the same as Algorithm 1.
We first show (in Example 1) that, in general, there can be an arbitrarily large gap between
the cost of the optimal deterministic mechanism and that of the optimal randomized mechanism,
even when restricted to truthful mechanisms and when all types share the same utility function.
4In a more empirically focused companion paper [Krishnaswamy et al., 2021], we apply a simplified version of
Algorithm 1 to a special case of the problem studied in this paper. There, the goal is to find a nearly optimal binary
classifier (i.e., m = 2), given only sample access to the population distribution over the type space.
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Figure 1: An example of the graph constructed in Algorithm 1. As highlighted in the left graph,
each row corresponds to an outcome and each column corresponds to a type. The horizontal edges
with infinite capacity correspond to the fact that type 2 can misreport as type 1. The right graph
gives a possible s-t min-cut, which corresponds to a mechanism where M(1) = o2, M(2) = (o3),
and M(3) = o3. The horizontal edges make sure that type 1 never gets a more desirable outcome
than type 2, so type 2 never misreports. The cost of the mechanism M is equal to the value of the
min-cut, which is c1(o2) + c2(o3) + c3(o3).
Example 1 (Gap between Deterministic and Randomized Mechanisms). There are 2 types Θ =
{1, 2} and 3 outcomes O = {o1 = 1, o2 = 2, o3 = 3}, which encode the common utility function.
The principal’s cost is given by c1(o1) = c1(o3) = ∞, c1(o2) = 0, c2(o1) = c2(o3) = 0, and
c2(o2) = ∞. The reporting structure R allows any type to report any other type, i.e., R =
{(1, 1), (2, 2), (1, 2), (2, 1)}. Consider first the optimal truthful randomized mechanism, which as
we argue below has cost 0. To make the principal’s cost finite, the optimal truthful mechanism
must assign outcome o2 to type 1 with probability 1, which gives type 1 utility 2. To prevent
misreporting, the mechanism must give type 2 the same expected utility. And again, to make the
cost finite, it must never assign outcome o2 to type 2. The unique way to satisfy the above is to
assign to type 2 outcome o1 with probability 1/2, and o3 with probability 1/2.
Now consider any deterministic truthful mechanism. Any truthful mechanism must give both
types the same utility to prevent misreporting. The only way to achieve this deterministically is to
assign the same outcome to both types. However, all 3 possibilities result in infinite total cost, so
all deterministic truthful mechanisms have cost infinity.
Example 1 shows that Algorithm 1 in general does not find an (approximately) optimal truthful
mechanism when randomized mechanisms are allowed. In such cases, one has to fall back to
significantly slower algorithms, e.g., solving the straightforward LP formulation of the problem
with mn variables and n2 constraints. It is worth noting that the LP formulation does not utilize
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Algorithm 1: Finding an optimal deterministic mechanism.
Input: The set of types Θ, the principal’s cost function {ci}i∈Θ for each type, the set of
outcomes O (which encodes the agents’ common utility function), and the
reporting structure R.
Output: A deterministic truthful mechanism M : Θ→ O minimizing the principal’s cost.
1 Let V ← (Θ×O) ∪ {s, t}, E ← ∅;
2 Replace R with its transitive closure (using the Floyd–Warshall algorithm):
3 for i2, i1, i3 ∈ Θ where (i1, i2) ∈ R and (i2, i3) ∈ R do
4 R← R ∪ {(i1, i3)} ;
5 end
6 for each type i ∈ Θ do
7 E ← E ∪ {(s, (i, o1),∞)} (add an edge from s to (i, o1) with capacity ∞) ;
8 for each outcome j ∈ [m− 1] do
9 E ← E ∪ {((i, oj), (i, oj+1), ci(oj))} (add an edge from (i, oj) to (i, oj+1) with
capacity ci(oj));
10 end
11 E ← E ∪ {((i, om), t, ci(om))} (add an edge from (i, om) to t with capacity ci(om));
12 end
13 for each pair of types (i1, i2) where i1 6= i2 and (i1, i2) ∈ R, and each outcome oj ∈ O do
14 E ← E ∪ {((i2, oj), (i1, oj),∞)} (add an edge from (i2, oj) to (i1, oj) with capacity ∞);
15 end
16 Compute an s-t min-cut (S, S) on graph G = (V,E) ;
17 for each type i ∈ Θ do
18 Let M(i) = oj where j = max{j′ ∈ [m] | (i, oj′) ∈ S};
19 end
20 return M ;
the fact that types share an identical utility function. To address this issue, we identify an important
special case where there does exist an optimal truthful mechanism that is deterministic: when the
principal’s cost is convex in the common utility function. More importantly, as we will show in
Section 2.5, we can reduce the problem of finding the optimal randomized mechanism under general
costs to the problem of finding the optimal mechanism with convex costs. First we formally define
the notion of convex costs we use.
Definition 1 (Convex Costs). For any i ∈ Θ, let the piecewise linear extension c`i : [o1, om]→ R+








where j = max{j′ ∈ [m] | oj′ ≤ x}. The principal’s cost function {ci}i∈Θ is convex if for every
i ∈ Θ, the piecewise linear extension c`i of ci is convex.
Lemma 1 (Optimality of Deterministic Mechanisms with Convex Costs). When all types share
the same utility function, and the principal’s cost function is convex, there is an optimal truthful
mechanism that is deterministic even with partial verification allowed.
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Algorithm 2: Finding an optimal (possibly randomized) truthful mechanism.
Input: The set of types Θ, the principal’s cost function {ci}i∈Θ for each type, the set of
outcomes O (which encodes the common utility function), and the reporting
structure R.
Output: A truthful mechanism M : Θ→ O minimizing the principal’s cost.
1 for each type i do
2 Compute the convex envelope c−i : [o1, om]→ R+ of ci, defined such that for any
x ∈ [o1, om],
c−i (x) = min
o∈∆(O),E[o]=x
E[ci(o)].
Let ĉi be c
−
i restricted to O;
3 end
4 Run Algorithm 1 on input (Θ, {ĉi}i∈Θ,O, R). Let M̂ be the resulting deterministic
mechanism;




8 return M ;
2.5 Reducing General Costs to Convex Costs
Lemma 1 together with Algorithm 1 provides an efficient way for finding optimal truthful mecha-
nisms with convex costs (even when randomized mechanisms are allowed). One may still wonder
if it is possible to design faster algorithms in general than solving the standard LP formulation,
presumably by exploiting the additional structure that the agents share the same utility function.
To this end, we observe that for computing optimal mechanisms, only the convex envelope of the
principal’s cost function matters. Given this observation, we show that finding optimal truthful
mechanisms can be reduced very efficiently to finding optimal deterministic mechanisms.
We present Algorithm 2, which computes the optimal truthful mechanism and has the same
asymptotic runtime as Algorithm 1. Algorithm 2 first computes the convex envelope of the prin-
cipal’s cost function, and then finds an optimal “deterministic” mechanism by calling Algorithm 1
with the same types and outcomes, but replacing the principal’s cost function with its convex enve-
lope. Algorithm 2 then recovers an optimal randomized mechanism from the “deterministic” one,
by interpreting each “deterministic” outcome as a convex combination of outcomes in an optimal
way. The following theorem establishes the correctness and time complexity of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 2 finds an optimal (possibly randomized) truthful mechanism, in asymp-
totically the same time as Algorithm 1.
Below we give a comparison between the time complexity of our algorithm, Algorithm 2, and
that of the LP-based approach.5 The current best algorithm for LP [Cohen et al., 2019] takes time
that translates to Õ(n2.37m2.37 + n4.74)6 in our setting (this is, for example, at least Õ(n3.24m1.5)).
The current best algorithm for s-t min-cut [Lee and Sidford, 2014] takes time that translates
5We note that a conclusive comparison is unrealistic since algorithms for both LP and min-cut keep being improved.
6Õ hides a poly-logarithmic factor.
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to Õ(n2.5m1.5) in our setting. Moreover, in a typical classification setting, it is the number of
outcomes (corresponding to “accept”, etc.) m that is small, and the number of types (e.g., “(CS
major, highly competitive, female, international, . . . )”, “(math major, acceptable, male, domestic,
. . . )”) n is much larger. In such cases, the improvement becomes even more significant. Our results
are theoretical, but practically, while there are highly optimized packages for LP, there are also
highly optimized packages for max-flow / min-cut that are still much faster. Last but not least, in
many practical settings, the principal has to implement a deterministic policy (it is hard to imagine
college admissions explicitly made random), in which case our Algorithm 1 can be applied while
LP generally does not give a solution.
3 Generalizing to Combinatorial Costs
In this section, we generalize the problem considered in the previous section, allowing the principal
to have a combinatorial cost function over outcomes for each type. See Appendix A for a more
detailed exposition.
The combinatorial setting. As before, let Θ = [n] be the set of types, O = {oj}j∈[m] ⊆ R+
be the set of outcomes encoding the common utility function, and R ⊆ Θ × Θ be the reporting
structure. The principal’s cost function c : OΘ → R+ now maps a vector O = (Oi)i of outcomes
for all types to the principal’s cost c(O). This subsumes the additive case, since one can set the






Because the cost function is now combinatorial, it matters how the mechanism combines outcomes
for different types. We therefore modify the definition of a randomized mechanism M ∈ ∆(Θ →
O) = ∆(OΘ), so that it allows correlation across different types. The principal’s cost from using
a truthful mechanism M is then c(M) = E[c((M(i))i)]. For type i, the utility from executing
mechanism M is still ui(M) = E[M(i)]. M is truthful iff for any (i1, i2) ∈ R, ui1(M) ≥ ui2(M). In
the rest of the section, we present combinatorial generalizations of all our algorithmic and structural
results given in the previous section.
General vs. submodular cost functions. Combinatorial functions in general are notoriously
hard to optimize, even ignoring incentive issues. To see the difficulty, observe that a combinatorial
cost function c : OΘ → R+ over OΘ generally does not even admit a succinct representation
(e.g., one whose size is polynomial in m and n). It is therefore infeasible to take the entire cost
function as input to an algorithm. To address this issue, the standard assumption in combinatorial
optimization is that algorithms can access the combinatorial function through value queries. That
is, we are given an oracle that can evaluate the combinatorial function c at any point O ∈ OΘ,
obtaining the value c(O) in constant time. For the rest of the paper, we assume that our algorithm
can access the cost function only through value queries.
Still, in order to minimize an arbitrary combinatorial function, in general one needs Ω(mn)
queries to obtain any nontrivial approximation. Despite that, there exist efficient algorithms for
combinatorial minimization for an important subclass of cost functions, namely submodular func-
tions.
Definition 2 (Submodular Functions). For any O1 = (O
i
1)i ∈ OΘ and O2 = (Oi2)i ∈ OΘ, let
O1 ∧O2 = (min(Oi1, Oi2))i and O1 ∨O2 = (max(Oi1, Oi2))i.
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A combinatorial cost function c : OΘ → R+ is submodular if for any O1, O2 ∈ OΘ,
c(O1) + c(O2) ≥ c(O1 ∧O2) + c(O1 ∨O2).
In the rest of this section, we focus on submodular cost functions. For this important special
case, we give efficient algorithms for finding optimal truthful deterministic / randomized mecha-
nisms, as well as a sufficient condition for the existence of an optimal mechanism that is determin-
istic.
Finding optimal deterministic mechanisms. First we present a polynomial-time combinatorial
algorithm for finding optimal truthful deterministic mechanisms with partial verification, when the
cost function is submodular.
Theorem 5. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm which accesses the cost function via value
queries only, and computes an optimal deterministic truthful mechanism when partial verification
is allowed and the cost function is submodular.
Sufficient condition for the optimality of deterministic mechanisms. Restricted to additive
cost functions, Lemma 1 gives a sufficient condition under which there exists an optimal mechanism
that is deterministic. We present below a combinatorial version of this structural result when the
outcome space is binary, i.e., when m = 2.
Theorem 6 (Optimality of Deterministic Mechanisms with Binary Outcomes). When the outcome
space is binary, i.e., |O| = 2, and the principal’s cost function is submodular, there is an optimal
truthful mechanism that is deterministic, even when partial verification is allowed.
Computing optimal randomized mechanisms. Finally we give an algorithm for finding an
optimal mechanism with arbitrary submodular cost functions.
Theorem 7. When the cost function c is submodular and bounded, for any desired additive error
ε > 0, there is an algorithm which finds an ε-approximately optimal (possibly randomized) truthful
mechanism7 in time poly(n,m, log(1/ε)), even if partial verification is allowed.
7An ε-approximately optimal truthful mechanism is a truthful mechanism whose expected cost is at most ε larger
than the minimum possible cost of any truthful mechanism.
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Sébastien Bubeck. Convex optimization: Algorithms and complexity. Foundations and Trends®
in Machine Learning, 8(3-4):231–357, 2015.
Yiling Chen, Chara Podimata, Ariel D Procaccia, and Nisarg Shah. Strategyproof linear regression
in high dimensions. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation,
pages 9–26, 2018.
Michael B Cohen, Yin Tat Lee, and Zhao Song. Solving linear programs in the current matrix
multiplication time. In Proceedings of the 51st annual ACM SIGACT symposium on theory of
computing, pages 938–942, 2019.
Richard Cole and Tim Roughgarden. The sample complexity of revenue maximization. In Proceed-
ings of the forty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 243–252, 2014.
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of mechanism design. In Proceedings of the
Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence, pages 103–110, 2002.
13
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Self-interested automated mechanism design and implica-
tions for optimal combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic
commerce, pages 132–141, 2004.
Ofer Dekel, Felix Fischer, and Ariel D Procaccia. Incentive compatible regression learning. Journal
of Computer and System Sciences, 76(8):759–777, 2010.
Nikhil R Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, and Christos-Alexandros Psomas. The sample complexity of
auctions with side information. In Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on
Theory of Computing, pages 426–439, 2016.
Paul Duetting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David Parkes, and Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath.
Optimal auctions through deep learning. In International Conference on Machine Learning,
pages 1706–1715, 2019.
Yannai A Gonczarowski and S Matthew Weinberg. The sample complexity of up-to-ε multi-
dimensional revenue maximization. In 2018 IEEE 59th Annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science (FOCS), pages 416–426. IEEE, 2018.
Jerry R Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont. Partially verifiable information and mechanism design.
The Review of Economic Studies, 53(3):447–456, 1986.
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A Generalizing to Combinatorial Costs
In this section, we generalize the problem considered in the previous section, allowing the principal
to have a combinatorial cost function over outcomes for each type. The problem studied in the
previous section can be viewed as a special case (where the principal’s cost function is additive over
types) of this general problem. Before we proceed to the formal definition of the problem, to better
motivate combinatorial cost functions, consider the following example.
Example 2. Suppose in addition to an additive cost function {ci}i∈Θ, the principal has to pay an
overhead cost c0 > 0 as long as any type receives a nontrivial outcome, i.e., if there exists i ∈ Θ,
such that M(i) ∈ O \ {o1}. In such cases, the principal’s overall cost from executing a truthful




ci(M(i)) + c0 · I[∃i ∈ Θ : M(i) 6= o1],
where I[·] is the indicator of a statement.
In the above rather natural example, the principal’s cost is no longer additive over types. As
a result, there is no way to properly formulate Example 2 using our previous definitions. We
generalize the principal’s cost function, as well as the definition of mechanisms, as follows.
Notation. As before, let Θ = [n] be the set of types, O = {oj}j∈[m] ⊆ R+ be the set of outcomes
encoding the common utility function, and R ⊆ Θ×Θ be the reporting structure. The principal’s
cost function c : OΘ → R+ now maps a vector O = (Oi)i of outcomes for all types to the principal’s






Because the cost function is now combinatorial, it matters how the mechanism combines outcomes
for different types. We therefore modify the definition of a (possibly randomized) mechanism
M ∈ ∆(Θ → O) = ∆(OΘ), such that it allows correlation across different types. The principal’s
cost from executing a truthful mechanism M is then
c(M) = E[c((M(i))i)].
We treat M as a distribution or a random variable over OΘ interchangeably. Note that each
type’s utility is still independent of what other types get. So for type i, the utility from executing
mechanism M is still
ui(M) = E[M(i)].
And M is truthful iff for any (i1, i2) ∈ R,
ui1(M) ≥ ui2(M).
In the rest of the section, we present combinatorial generalizations of all our algorithmic and
structural results given in the previous section.
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A.1 General vs. Submodular Cost Functions
Combinatorial functions in general are notoriously hard to optimize, even ignoring incentive issues.
To see the difficulty, observe that a combinatorial cost function c : OΘ → R+ over OΘ generally
does not even admit a succinct representation (e.g., one whose size is polynomial in m and n). It
is therefore infeasible to take the entire cost function as input to an algorithm.
To address this issue, the standard assumption in combinatorial optimization is that algorithms
can access the combinatorial function through value queries. That is, we are given an oracle that
can evaluate the combinatorial function c at any point O ∈ OΘ, obtaining the value c(O) in constant
time. For the rest of the paper, we assume that our algorithm can only access the cost function
only through value queries.
Now suppose we are to design an algorithm to minimize an arbitrary combinatorial cost function,
without any additional constraint. That is, given a combinatorial cost function c : OΘ → R+, we
wish to find a point O ∈ OΘ, such that c(O) is minimized over OΘ. The example below shows that
any algorithm which interacts with c only through value queries needs Ω(mn) queries to obtain any
nontrivial approximation to the above seemingly basic problem.
Example 3. Let the cost function c be generated in the following random way. A point O∗ is
drawn from OΘ uniformly at random. c is then constructed such that c(O∗) = 0, and c(O) = 1
for any O 6= O∗. To minimize c, the algorithm has to find O∗. This is equivalent to guessing a
uniformly random number among mn numbers. To guess O∗ successfully with constant probability,
one has to make Ω(mn) guesses.
The above issue has been identified in combinatorial optimization since decades ago. Despite
the fact that general combinatorial cost functions are hard to minimize, researchers have developed
efficient algorithms for combinatorial minimization for an important subclass of cost functions,
namely submodular functions, defined below.
Definition 3 (Submodular Functions). For any O1 = (O
i
1)i ∈ OΘ and O2 = (Oi2)i ∈ OΘ, let
O1 ∧O2 = (min(Oi1, Oi2))i and O1 ∨O2 = (max(Oi1, Oi2))i.
A combinatorial cost function c : OΘ → R+ is submodular, if for any O1, O2 ∈ OΘ,
c(O1) + c(O2) ≥ c(O1 ∧O2) + c(O1 ∨O2).
In the rest of the section, we focus on submodular cost functions. For this important special case,
we give efficient algorithms for finding optimal truthful deterministic/randomized mechanisms, as
well as a sufficient condition for the existence of an optimal mechanism that is deterministic.
A.2 Finding Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms
First we present a polynomial-time combinatorial algorithm for finding optimal truthful determin-
istic mechanisms with partial verification, when the cost function is submodular. The algorithm is
based on the key observation that the space of truthful deterministic mechanisms is a distributive
lattice (defined below in Lemma 2). Given this observation, it is known that the problem can be
reduced to minimizing a submodular function without additional constraints, which can be solved
efficiently.
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Lemma 2. Fix the set of types Θ, the set of outcomes O, and the reporting structure R. Let
T ⊆ OΘ be the space of all possible ways of assigning outcomes to types, such that no type has the
incentive to misreport. That is,
T = {O = (Oi)i ∈ OΘ | ∀(i1, i2) ∈ R, Oi1 ≥ Oi2}.
Then T is a distributive lattice, i.e., T satisfies the following conditions.
• For any O1, O2 ∈ T , O1 ∧O2 ∈ T , and O1 ∨O2 ∈ T .
• For any O1, O2, O3 ∈ T , O1 ∨ (O2 ∧O3) = (O1 ∨O2) ∧ (O1 ∨O3).
Proof. Consider the first property. Fix any O1, O2 ∈ T , and let O− = O1 ∧O2, and O+ = O1 ∨O2.















2 ) = O
i2
− .
This implies O− ∈ T . Similarly we may show O+ ∈ T . In other words, the first property holds.















Since this is true for any i, the second property follows immediately.
Given Lemma 2, we can apply the algorithm and the reduction by Schrijver [2000] to obtain an
efficient algorithm directly.
Corollary 1. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm which accesses the cost function via value
queries only, and computes an optimal deterministic truthful mechanism when partial verification
is allowed and the cost function is submodular.
Proof. Let T be the family of truthful assignments defined in Lemma 2. The problem of find-





This can be solved by applying the reduction in Section 6 of Schrijver [2000]8 to any algorithm for
minimizing submodular functions (e.g., the one given in Schrijver [2000]).
We remark that the algorithm by Schrijver [2000] can be applied as well in the classical additive
setting, but due to its generality, is significantly less efficient than Algorithm 1.
A.3 Sufficient Condition for the Optimality of Deterministic Mechanisms
We have shown in Example 1 that the gap between deterministic and randomized mechanisms can
be arbitrarily large. Restricted to additive cost functions, Lemma 1 gives a sufficient condition
under which there exists an optimal mechanism that is deterministic. We present in this subsection
a combinatorial version of this structural result when the outcome space is binary, i.e., when m = 2.
8Although the reduction presented therein is for ring families, one may check it also works for distributive lattices.
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Lemma 3 (Optimality of Deterministic Mechanisms with Binary Outcomes). When the outcome
space is binary, i.e., |O| = 2, and the principal’s cost function is submodular, there is an optimal
truthful mechanism that is deterministic, even when partial verification is allowed.
Proof. The overall plan is similar to that of the proof of Lemma 1. We begin with a (possibly
randomized) optimal truthful mechanism M , and show that without loss of generality, we may
assume its support has some monotone structure. We then round this mechanism, such that
the resulting deterministic mechanism is always truthful, and the expected cost of the rounded
mechanism is equal to the cost of M .
Without loss of generality, suppose O = {0, 1}. Observe that OΘ is isomorphic to 2Θ, so in the
rest of the proof, we interchangeably represent an outcome vector O as a subset of Θ, i.e., the set
{i ∈ Θ | Oi = 1}.
Let M be any (possibly randomized) optimal truthful mechanism. Below we treat M as a random
variable distributed over OΘ, or interchangeably, a random subset of Θ. For any O ∈ OΘ, let
p(O) = Pr[M = O] be the probability that M assigns outcomes O to types. We further require M





We argue below that for such an M , no two outcome vectors in the support of M “cross.”
We say two outcome vectors O1 and O2 (represented as sets) cross, if O1 6⊆ O2 and O2 6⊆ O1.
Toward a contradiction, suppose O1 and O2 cross, where without loss of generality p(O1) ≥ p(O2) >
0. Let p = p(O2). We show that moving probability mass from O1 and O2 to O1 ∩O2 and O1 ∪O2
simultaneously preserves truthfulness, does not increase the cost, and strictly increases the potential
of M , which contradicts the choice of M .
To be precise, we decrease p(O1) and p(O2) simultaneously by p, and increase p(O1 ∩ O2) and
p(O1 ∪ O2) simultaneously by p. To see why truthfulness is preserved, observe that the expected
utility of any type does not change after the modification. The change of the cost can be written
as
∆c(M) = p · (c(O1 ∩O2) + c(O1 ∪O2)− c(O1)− c(O2))
≤ p · (c(O1) + c(O2)− c(O1)− c(O2)) (submodularity of c)
= 0,
so the cost does not increase. Finally, the change of the potential is
p · (|O1 ∩O2|2 + |O1 ∪O2|2 − |O1|2 − |O2|2).
It is easy to check the above is strictly positive as long as O1 and O2 cross.
From now on we assume no two outcomes in the support of M cross, or equivalently, the support
of M is a family of nested subsets of Θ. For any r ∈ [0, 1], let Mr ⊆ Θ be such that
Mr = {i ∈ Θ | ui ≥ r}.
Observe that Mr is truthful for any r ∈ [0, 1]. In fact, for any (i1, i2) ∈ R, we always have
i2 ∈Mr =⇒ i1 ∈ R.
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Truthfulness then follows.
Consider the random (but not randomized) mechanism Mr when r is uniformly distributed over
[0, 1]. We argue below that the expected cost of Mr is precisely that of M . In fact, Mr and M are
even identically distributed. For any i ∈ Θ, let the expected utility of type i be ui = Pr[i ∈ M ].
Without loss of generality, suppose M satisfies ui ≥ ui+1 for any i ∈ [n − 1]. To show Mr and M
are identically distributed, we only need to show that
p(O) > 0 =⇒ ∃i ∈ Θ, O = [i].
In other words, M only assigns outcomes that are prefixes of Θ. Given this, Mr is the only
distribution that gives each type i expected utility ui simultaneously.
To see why the above claim is true, suppose there exists some O ⊆ Θ where 1 /∈ O and p(O) > 0.
Then since the support of M is a nested family of subsets of Θ, for any i ∈ O, regardless of the
realization of M , we always have





p(O′) ≥ p(O) +
∑
O′⊆Θ:1∈O′
p(O′) = p(O) + u1 > u1,
a contradiction. This concludes the proof.
We make the following remarks regarding Lemma 3.
• The binary outcomes assumption, despite being more restrictive than the general model, still
captures many real-life applications. In particular, it models binary classification problems where
one label is more desirable than the other for all agents. Common examples include hiring
decisions, university admissions, etc. Moreover, such decisions are generally correlated over
types (e.g., universities cannot admit too many students) — this is captured by the principal’s
submodular cost function.
• The proof of Lemma 3 can be alternatively interpreted in the following way. Without loss of gen-
erality, any optimal mechanism corresponds to a point on the convex envelope of the principal’s
cost function. And for submodular cost functions particularly, this convex envelope happens
to coincide with the Lovász extension (see Grötschel et al. [1984]), which can be derandomized
into deterministic mechanisms preserving truthfulness. We will further develop this intuition in
the next result, which is an efficient algorithm for finding optimal truthful mechanisms for any
submodular function.
A.4 An Efficient Algorithm for Computing Optimal Randomized Mechanisms
In this subsection, we present an algorithm for finding an optimal mechanism with arbitrary sub-
modular cost functions.
Our algorithm, Algorithm 3, again builds on the intuition that for optimal mechanisms, only
the convex envelope of the cost function matters. The problem of finding optimal mechanisms can
therefore be formulated as a convex program. However, unlike in Algorithm 2, with submodular
cost functions, it is not clear how one can efficiently evaluate the convex envelope of the cost
function.
20
Algorithm 3: Finding an optimal mechanism with submodular cost functions.
Input: The set of types Θ, the principal’s submodular cost function c, the set of outcomes
O (which encodes the common utility function), the reporting structure R, and a
precision parameter ε.
Output: An optimal truthful mechanism M ∈ ∆(Θ→ O).
1 Compute an ε-approximately optimal solution p∗i,j to the following convex program using
the ellipsoid method (see, e.g., Bubeck [2015]), and call Algorithm 4 with parameters








pi1,j · oj ≥
∑
j∈[m]
pi2,j · oj ∀(i1, i2) ∈ R∑
j∈[m]
pi,j = 1 ∀i ∈ Θ
pi,j ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Θ, j ∈ [m];
2 for each O ∈ OΘ do
3 Pr[M = O]← prob(O | {p∗i,j});
4 end
5 return M ;
To get around this issue, instead of parametrizing by the target utilities, we parametrize the
convex envelope by the marginal probabilities {pi,j}i∈Θ,j∈[m], where pi,j is the probability that type
i gets outcome oj . One of the key ingredients of Algorithm 3 is a subroutine (Algorithm 4) which
efficiently interprets each point on the convex envelope as a convex combination of integral points,
corresponding to a distribution over combinations of outcomes. In other words, given the desired
marginal probabilities, Algorithm 4 finds a randomized truthful mechanism realizing these marginal
probabilities which minimizes the principal’s expected cost.
Theorem 8. When the cost function c is submodular and bounded, for any desired additive error
ε > 0, Algorithm 3 finds an ε-approximately optimal (possibly randomized) truthful mechanism 9
in time poly(n,m, log(1/ε)), even if partial verification is allowed.
Proof. Consider the program in Algorithm 3. Observe there are mn variables, namely {pi,j}, and
O(n2 +mn) linear constraints in the program. In order for the program to be efficiently solvable,
we only need to show the following three claims hold.
• The subroutine for evaluating the convex envelope, Algorithm 4, runs in polynomial time.
• The objective is convex in {pi,j}.
9An ε-approximately optimal truthful mechanism is a truthful mechanism whose expected cost is at most ε larger
than the minimum possible cost of any truthful mechanism.
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Algorithm 4: Algorithm for interpreting the convex envelope.
Input: Marginal probabilities {pi,j}i,j , where pi,j is the desired probability that type i
gets outcome oj .
Output: A distribution {prob(O | {pi,j})}O∈OΘ over combinations of outcomes.
1 Let prob(O)← 0 for all O ∈ OΘ;
2 while there is some pi,j > 0 do
3 for each i ∈ Θ do
4 ti ← max{j ∈ [m] | pi,j > 0};
5 end
6 δ ← mini pi,ti ; prob((ti)i∈[n])← δ;
7 for each i ∈ Θ do
8 pi,ti ← pi,ti − δ;
9 end
10 return {prob(O)}O∈OΘ ;
11 end
• A first-order oracle, which computes a (sub)gradient of the objective function at any point, can be
efficiently implemented. (The ellipsoid method also requires an efficient separation oracle, which
for our program exists straightforwardly, since there are only poly(n,m) linear constraints.)
The second claim and the third claim also imply the correctness of the Algorithm. Below we prove
the three claims.
Consider the first claim. We only need to show that the while-loop at line 2 repeats only




max{j ∈ [m] | pi,j > 0}.
Before line 2, the value of φ is at most mn. Observe that φ is monotone in {pi,j}, and the latter
never increase during the execution of the loop. Moreover, in each repetition of the loop, φ decreases
at least by 1. This is because after the update in line 9, for some i ∈ Θ, pi,ti becomes 0, and as a
result, max{j ∈ [m] | pi,j > 0} decreases at least by 1. When φ becomes 0, it must be the case that
pi,j = 0 for any i ∈ Θ, j ∈ [m], so the loop terminates. Therefore the while-loop repeats at most
mn times, which implies the first claim.
Now consider the second claim. We show that in Algorithm 4, the output distribution {p(O)}
minimizes the expected cost ∑
O∈OΘ
p(O) · c(O)
among all distributions whose marginals are {pi,j} — this is equivalent to the second claim. We
first prove the following characterization of the output distribution {p(O)}.
Lemma 4. The output distribution {p(O)} of Algorithm 4 is the only distribution over OΘ satis-
fying the following properties.
• {p(O)} induce the input marginal probabilities {pi,j} over type-outcome pairs.
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• For any O1, O2 ∈ OΘ, if O1 ∧ O2 /∈ {O1, O2}, then either p(O1) = 0 or p(O2) = 0. In other
words, no two combinations of outcomes in the support of {p(O)} cross.
Proof. The first bullet point is clear from the construction of {p(O)}. We therefore focus on
the second bullet point. We first show that for any marginal probabilities {pi,j} and distribution
{p′(O)}, if (1) {p′(O)} induce {pi,j} and no two combinations of outcomes in the support of {p′(O)}
cross, then the topmost combination of outcomes Ot, where
Oit = max{oj | j ∈ [m], pi,j > 0},




where ti = max{j ∈ [m] | pi,j > 0}.
Let δ = mini∈Θ pi,ti . Observe that p
′(Ot) ≤ δ. Suppose toward a contradiction that p′(Ot) < δ.
Since no two combinations of outcomes in the support of {p′(O)} cross, we can order the support
of {p′(O)} as O1, . . . , O`, where ` is the size of the support, such that for any i ∈ [`− 1],
Oi ∧Oi+1 = Oi+1.
Clearly we have Ot ∧O1 = O1. Consider the following two cases.











t ≤ oti∗ .
Then we have





k = oti∗ ] = 0,
a contradiction.











1 = oti∗ .
So we have





k = oti∗ ] ≤ p
′(O1) < δ,
a contradiction.
So in any case, we must have p′(Ot) = δ.
Now observe that the above argument does not depend on the fact that for any i ∈ Θ,∑
j∈[m] pi,j = 1. Therefore, we can repeatedly apply the characterization of the probability of
the topmost combination. That is, we first compute the probability of the topmost combination,
and subtract the marginal probabilities contributed by this topmost combination from {pi,j}. For
the new marginal probabilities, the characterization still applies to the new topmost combination,
by which we can determine the probability of that combination. This is precisely the procedure
implemented in Algorithm 4. By repeatedly applying the characterization, we obtain the unique
distribution over OΘ satisfying the conditions of the lemma, which is the output distribution {p(O)}
of Algorithm 4.
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Given Lemma 4, we then consider any distribution {p′(O)} which (1) induces marginal proba-
bilities {pi,j}, (2) minimizes the expected cost, and (3) among all distributions satisfying (1) and










The goal is to show such a distribution {p′(O)} satisfies the conditions of Lemma 4, and therefore
coincides with {p(O)}, the output of Algorithm 4. Moreover, such a distribution has the additional
property, that it minimizes the expected cost. In other words, the output distribution of Algorithm 4
minimizes the expected cost, which is equivalent to the second claim at the beginning of the proof.
To achieve the above goal, we only need to show that the distribution {p′(O)} chosen above
has the property, that no two combinations of outcomes in the support of {p′(O)} cross. Suppose
otherwise, i.e., there exist O1, O2 ∈ OΘ, such that O1 ∧ O2 /∈ {O1, O2} and p′(O1) > p′(O2) > 0.
Let q = p′(O2). We show that subtracting q from p
′(O1) and p
′(O2) simultaneously and adding q
to p′(O1 ∧ O2) and p′(O1 ∨ O2) simultaneously (1) preserves the marginal probabilities, (2) does
not increase the expected cost of {p′(O)}, and (3) strictly increases the potential function w, thus
leading to a contradiction. (1) clearly holds. (2) follows from the submodularity of c, i.e.,
q · (c(O1) + c(O2)) ≥ q · (c(O1 ∧O2) + c(O1 ∨O2)).
























This establishes second claim.
As for the third claim, i.e., the existence of an efficient first-order oracle, observe that the
distribution {prob(O | {pi,j})} output by Algorithm 4 is piecewise linear in {pi,j}. On the other
hand, the objective function is linear in the output distribution, and is therefore piecewise linear
in {pi,j}. This implies that (sub)gradients of the objective function can be easily computed, and
concludes the proof of the theorem.
We make a few remarks regarding Algorithm 3.
• In addition to the ellipsoid method, one may also apply gradient-based methods, e.g., projected
gradient descent, to solve the convex program in Algorithm 3. Gradient-based methods generally
perform better in practice, and they usually have better dependence on m and n but worse
(polynomial) dependence on 1/ε.
• Observe that Algorithm 3 outputs a randomized mechanism such that, in its support, no two com-
binations of outcomes cross. Therefore, when restricted to binary outcomes (m = 2), Lemma 3
gives a way to round the randomized mechanism output by Algorithm 3 into a deterministic one.
This gives an alternative way (in addition to Corollary 1) of computing optimal deterministic
mechanisms restricted to binary outcomes.
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B Omitted Definitions and Remarks in Section 2
B.1 Single-Peaked Preferences
Below we give a definition of single-peaked preferences.
Definition 4. Let O be the space of outcomes, Θ the space of types, and for each i ∈ Θ, ui : O →
R+ the utility function of an agent of type i. {ui}i are single-peaked if there exists an ordering
≺ over O, such that for each type i the following holds: there exists a most preferred outcome oi.
Moreover, for any two outcomes oj1 ≺ oj2 ,
• if oj2 ≺ oi, then ui(oj1) ≤ ui(oj2) ≤ ui(oi);
• if o∗ ≺ oj1 , then ui(oi) ≥ ui(oj1) ≥ ui(oj2).
In words, the above definition says that the outcomes can be ordered in a line, such that for
each type, there exists a most preferred outcome. Moreover, on both sides of this most preferred
outcome, the closer an outcome is to the most preferred the outcome, the higher the utility is for
that outcome.
B.2 Remarks on Algorithm 1
We make two remarks regarding Algorithm 1.
• For finding an optimal deterministic mechanism, the precise values of the agents’ utility functions
do not matter. Consequently, Algorithm 1 works as long as all types order the outcomes in the
same way.
• With minor modifications, Algorithm 1 can handle costly misreporting, in which there is a fixed
(non-negative) cost for type i to report as type i′. Partial verification is a special case of costly
misreporting: reporting either costs the agent 0 or ∞, and the reporting structure R is the set
of all reporting actions which cost 0. The key modification which allows Algorithm 1 to handle
costly misreporting is that the edges used to model the reporting structure can be diagonal (as
opposed to horizontal), where the slope of the edge depends on each type’s utility function and
the cost of misreporting. We will not expand on this in the current paper.
B.3 Remarks on Lemma 1
We make a few remarks regarding Lemma 1.
• The proof we present is a combination of several concrete arguments. There is an alternative
relatively high-level, and sometimes more useful, interpretation of the lemma, which is based
on a convex program formulation of the problem. We will make heavy use of this alternative
interpretation in the rest of the paper, especially when dealing with randomized mechanisms.
• Throughout the paper we assume payments are not allowed. One may show that with payments,
there always exists an optimal truthful mechanism that is deterministic, as long as both agents
and the principal value payments linearly. Moreover, there exist relatively simple algorithms for
computing an optimal mechanism with payments. We will not expand on this in the current
paper.
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B.4 Remarks on Algorithm 2
We make a few remarks regarding Algorithm 2.
• Algorithm 2 gives a constructive proof that finding an optimal truthful mechanism is always no
harder than finding an optimal truthful deterministic mechanism with convex costs. As a result,
a faster algorithm for the latter problem would imply a faster algorithm for the former.
• As a byproduct, Algorithm 2 shows that in general, to achieve the minimum cost, it suffices to
randomize only between two outcomes for each type, .
C Omitted Proofs in Section 2
Proof of Theorem 1. We give a reduction from MinSAT. Fix a MinSAT instance with n variables,
{xi}i∈[n], and m clauses, {Cj}j∈[m], and let `j,k ∈ Cj be the k-th literal in clause Cj . We construct
an AMD instance as follows.
• Create a type for each variable, each literal, and each clause, i.e., Θ = {xi, x+i , x
−
i }i∈[n]∪{Cj}j∈[m].
• There are two possible outcomes, O = {o+, o−}. Moreover, for any type θ ∈ Θ, uθ(o+) = 1 and
uθ(o
−) = 0.
• The principal’s cost is as follows.
– For each literal `, c`(o
+) = c`(o
−) = 0.
– For each variable xi, cxi(o
+) = 0 and cxi(o
−) = m+1, so any optimal mechanism never assigns
o− to a variable.
– For each clause Cj , cCj (o
+) = 1 and cCj (o
−) = 0, so any optimal mechanism minimizes the
number of clauses which get outcome o+.
• The reporting structure R is as follows.
– Each literal ` can only report itself.





– Each clause Cj can report itself, all variables, and all literals `j,k ∈ Cj contained in Cj .
Now consider the structure of optimal solutions for the above AMD instance. First observe
that without loss of generality, any optimal solution assigns o+ only to types which report literals.
Moreover, for each variable xi, any optimal solution assigns o
+ to exactly one of x+i and x
−
i . So
the problem boils down to choosing between the two literals for each variable.
On the other hand, each clause Cj will report any literal that is contained in Cj and assigned
outcome o+, as long as possible. Whenever this happens, the principal incurs cost 1 from this
clause. In other words, the principal incurs cost 1 from a clause iff one of the literals contained in
the clause is assigned outcome o+, i.e., iff the clause is satisfied. The total cost of the mechanism
is k, where k is the number of clauses satisfied. This encodes precisely the MinSAT instance.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider the following reduction from MinSAT. Fix a MinSAT instance with
n variables, {xi}i∈[n], and m clauses, {Cj}j∈[m], and let `j,k ∈ Cj be the k-th literal in clause Cj .
We construct an AMD instance as follows.
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• Create a type for each variable, each literal, and each clause, i.e., Θ = {xi, x+i , x
−
i }i∈[n]∪{Cj}j∈[m].
• There are three possible outcomes, O = {o+, o−, o0}.
• Let N1 >> N2 > m be large (but polynomial in n and m) numbers. The principal’s cost is as
follows.
– For each variable xi, cxi(o
+) = cxi(o
−) = 0, and cxi(o
0) = N1. As a result, an optimal
mechanism never assigns o0 to a variable.
– For each positive literal `+, c`+(o
+) = N2, c`+(o
0) = 0, and c`+(o
−) = N1. For each negative
literal `−, c`−(o
+) = N1, c`−(o
0) = 0, and c`−(o
−) = N2. We will see later that for any variable
xi, an optimal mechanism assigns precisely one of its literals the outcome with cost N2, and
the other outcome o0 with cost 0.
– For each clause Cj , cCj (o
+) = cCj (o
−) = 0, and cCj (o
0) = 1.
• The types’ utility functions are as follows.
– For each variable xi, uxi(o
+) = uxi(o
−) = uxi(o
0). Note that the numerical values of the utility
functions do not matter for deterministic mechanisms.
– For each positive literal `+, u`+(o
+) > u`+(o
0) > u`+(o





– For each clause Cj , uCj (o
0) > uCj (o
+) = uCj (o
−).
• The reporting structure R is as follows.
– Each variable xi can only report itself.
– Each literal ` can report itself or the variable it corresponds to.
– Each clause Cj can report itself, any literal ` ∈ Cj contained in the clause, or the variable `
corresponds to.
Now consider the structure of optimal deterministic mechanisms. For each variable xi, an
optimal mechanism assigns either o+ or o−. Moreover, for xi’s two literals, if xi is assigned o
+
(resp. o−), then the mechanism always assigns x+i o
+ (resp. o0) and x−i o
0 (resp. o−). One may
check this is the only way to minimize cost subject to incentive compatibility. So conceptually,
the mechanism chooses exactly one value for each variable, where assigning o0 to x+i (resp. x
−
i )
corresponds to choosing value 1 (resp. 0) for xi.
For each clause Cj , if any of the literals contained in Cj is chosen (i.e., is assigned outcome o
0),
then to prevent Cj from misreporting that literal, the mechanism must assign Cj outcome o
0, at
a cost of 1. This corresponds to the case where the clause is satisfied. Otherwise, if none of the
literals in Cj is chosen, the mechanism assigns either o
+ or o− to Cj , at a cost of 0. The total
cost of the mechanism is then nN2 + k, where k is the number of clauses satisfied. This encodes
precisely the MinSAT instance.
Proof of Theorem 3. First consider the runtime of Algorithm 1. The bottleneck is finding an s-t
min-cut on the graph G, which has mn+ 2 vertices and at most mn2 + (m+ 1)n edges. Therefore,
it is sufficient to show that one can replace the infinite capacities with capacity W + 1.
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We first prove that any horizontal edge with capacity W + 1 does not belong to any min-cut.
Suppose in some min-cut, for some j ∈ [m], a horizontal edge from (i1, oj) ∈ S to (i2, oj) /∈ S is
cut. We argue that including all out-neighbors of (i1, oj) through horizontal edges into S strictly
decreases the capacity of the cut. For each of these horizontal out-neighbors, by including it in S,
we decrease the cut value by W+1 (from one horizontal edge), and possibly incur an additional cost
from the edge between that neighbor and its vertical out-neighbor, whose capacity is at most W .
Because we take the transitive closure of R, the newly included vertices do not have any horizontal
out-neighbor out of S, so the total cost decreases at least by 1. A similar argument shows that
edges leaving S can be replaced to have capacity W + 1 as well.
Now we move on to proving the correctness of Algorithm 1. We assume the infinite-capacity
edges still have capacity∞ (rather than W + 1), which simplifies our argument. Observe that with
infinite capacities, taking the transitive closure of R in Line 3-5 of Algorithm 1 makes no difference.
We prove the correctness for the algorithm without this step.
The argument consists of two parts. First we show there is a one-to-one correspondence between
all finite-capacity downward-closed s-t cuts and all deterministic truthful mechanisms, where the
capacity of the cut is the same as the cost of the mechanism. We then show that taking the
downward closure of any cut does not increase its capacity, and as a result, we only need to
consider downward-closed cuts. These two claims together imply the correctness of Algorithm 1.
Formally, a cut (S, S) is downward closed, if for any i ∈ Θ and 1 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ m,
(i, oj2) ∈ S =⇒ (i, oj1) ∈ S.
Fix a downward closed cut (S, S), we construct a mechanism M : Θ → O in the same way as in
Line 17-19 of Algorithm 1. That is, for all i ∈ Θ,
M(i) = max{oj′ ∈ O | (i, oj′) ∈ S}.
The one-to-one correspondence follows immediately from the definition of M . We now argue (S, S)
has finite capacity iff M is truthful. Notice that (S, S) has finite capacity iff no horizontal edge is
cut, i.e., iff M(i1) ≥M(i2) for all (i1, i2) ∈ R, which is precisely the condition for the truthfulness
of M . Moreover, whenever (S, S) has finite capacity, the capacity is equal to the cost of the truthful
mechanism M .
Now we prove the second claim, i.e., taking the downward closure does not increase the capacity
of the cut. We first define the downward closure. Given any s-t cut (S, S), the downward closure
(C(S), C(S)) is defined such that for all i ∈ Θ,
(i, oj) ∈ C(S) ⇐⇒ j ≤ max{j′ ∈ [m] | (i, oj′) ∈ S}.
We show below that the capacity of C(S) is no larger than that of S.
If some horizontal edge is cut in S, then the cut has capacity∞ and the claim is trivial. Suppose
no horizontal edge is cut in S. Because the set of vertical edges cut in C(S) is a subset of those cut
in S, we only need to show that no horizontal edge is cut in C(S). Suppose for contradiction that
some horizontal edges are cut in C(S). Let i1, i2 ∈ Θ and j ∈ [m] be such that e = ((i1, oj), (i2, oj))
is one of the highest horizontal edges being cut in C(S). By the choice of e, it must be the case
that (i1, oj) ∈ S, and since S ⊆ C(S), we have (i2, oj) /∈ S. Therefore, the same edge e is also cut
in S, which leads to a contradiction.
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Proof of Lemma 1. We prove the lemma by construction. Let M be any (possibly randomized)
optimal truthful mechanism. We construct a deterministic truthful mechanism from M whose cost
is no larger than that of M .
First we show it suffices for M to randomize between only two consecutive outcomes for each
type i. Let pi(oj) be the probability that type i receives outcome oj . Suppose for some type i,
there exist j1, j2 ∈ [m], where j2 − j1 > 1, pi(oj1) > 0, and pi(oj2) > 0. We argue that one can
move probability mass from oj1 and oj2 to oj3 , where j3 = j1 + 1 lies between j1 and j2, without
violating truthfulness or increasing the total cost.
Let 0 < α < 1 be such that oj3 = αoj1 + (1 − α)oj2 . Without loss of generality suppose
pi(oj1)/α ≤ pi(oj2)/(1 − α). For brevity let p = pi(oj1). We show that the following operation
achieves the above goal.
• Decrease pi(oj1) by p.
• Decrease pi(oj2) by (1− α) · p/α ≤ pi(oj2).
• Increase pi(oj3) by p/α.
Observe that (1) after the operation, the probabilities of each outcome still sum to 1, and (2) type
i receives exactly the same expected utility. The principal’s cost changes by
p
α
· ci(oj3)− p · ci(oj1)−





























= 0. (oj3 = α · oj1 + (1− α) · oj2)
In other words, the total cost does not increase.
We then apply the above operation in the following way. Fix i, and let j− = min{j | pi(oj) > 0},
and j+ = max{j | pi(oj) > 0}. As long as j+−j− > 1, apply the operation to i, j− and j+. Observe
that each time we apply the operation, j+− j− decreases by at least 1, so eventually we must stop
and j+−j− ≤ 1. Performing this for each i yields a mechanism which randomizes only between two
consecutive outcomes for each type, without increasing the total cost. Without loss of generality,
from now on, we assume M has this property.
Now we show there is a way to round M , producing a distribution over deterministic truthful
mechanisms, such that the expected cost of this distribution is precisely the cost of M . As a result,
there exists one mechanism in the support of the distribution, whose cost is upper bounded by that
of M , which is our desired deterministic truthful mechanism.
For each type i, let ji = min{j | pi(j) > 0} and αi = pi(ji + 1). Note that 0 ≤ αi < 1 for all i.
For any r ∈ [0, 1], let Mr be the deterministic mechanism defined such that for each type i,
Mr(i) =
{
oji+1, r ≤ αi,
oji , otherwise.
.
We first argue that Mr is truthful for any r ∈ [0, 1]. Fix any pair (i1, i2) ∈ R. Given that M itself
is truthful, we proceed by considering the following two cases.
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• ji1 > ji2 . In such cases, we always have Mr(i1) ≥Mr(i2), so i1 has no incentive to report i2.
• ji1 = ji2 and αi1 ≥ αi2 . For any r ∈ [0, 1], we have
r ≤ αi1 ⇐= r ≤ αi2 .
So again, regardless of r, Mr(i1) ≥Mr(i2).
Applying the above argument to each pair (i1, i2) ∈ R establishes the truthfulness of Mr for any
r ∈ [0, 1].
Now consider the distribution over deterministic mechanisms Mr when r is uniformly distributed


















which concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4. We prove the correctness first. Observe that the problem of finding a (ran-





subject to ui =
∑
j
pi,j · oj ∀i ∈ Θ
ui1 ≥ ui2 ∀(i1, i2) ∈ R∑
j
pi,j = 1 ∀i ∈ Θ
pi,j ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Θ, j ∈ [m].
Here, ui is the expected utility of type i, and pi,j is the probability of assigning type i outcome oj .
This is not the most succinct LP formulation of the problem, but it capture the structure of the
problem in a way that is more useful for our analysis.
Now fix {ui}i and consider the optimal choice of {pi,j}i,j . This can be solved separately for each
type i, by considering the following linear program (with the additional constraints that {pi,j}j are








pi,j · oj = ui.
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This is precisely evaluating the convex envelope c−i of ci at ui ∈ [o1, om]. Consequently, the problem





s.t. ui1 ≤ ui2 , ∀(i1, i2) ∈ R,
ui ∈ [o1, om], ∀i ∈ Θ.
Now observe that the reformulated program cannot distinguish between {ci}i∈Θ and {ĉi}i∈Θ,
where ĉi is c
−
i restricted to O as in Algorithm 2 — the two cost functions simply induce exactly
the same program. Moreover, observe that the newly constructed cost function {ĉi}i∈Θ is convex,
according to Definition 1. Given this convexity, Lemma 1 implies that there exists a deterministic
mechanism for {ĉi}i which is optimal. In other words, there exists an optimal solution {ui}i to the
reformulated program in which ui ∈ O for each i ∈ Θ. Algorithm 2 finds such a solution {ui}i by
calling Algorithm 1.
Now the only problem left is to recover {pi,j}j from ui for each type i. This is done in Line 6 of
Algorithm 2. Since the output mechanism M implements {ui}i in an optimal way, it is a truthful
mechanism that minimizes the principal’s cost. This establishes the correctness of Algorithm 2.
Now we consider the time complexity. Compared to Algorithm 1, the additional steps in
Algorithm 2 include (1) computing {ĉi}i in Line 2, and (2) interpreting M̂(i) as an optimal convex
combination of outcomes in Line 6. We will show that both operations can be done in time O(mn),
i.e., linear in the size of the input. The time complexity of Algorithm 2 then follows immediately.
For computing the convex envelope of ci, one may use the classical algorithm by Andrew [1979],
which scans O from left to right, and maintains a stack containing the partial convex envelope of
ci on {o1, . . . , oj} for every j ∈ [m]. The algorithm runs in time O(m).
Once we know {ĉi}, to find an optimal convex combination for a target utility ui, we first find in
time O(m) the largest integer ` ∈ [m] such that o` ≤ ui and ci(o`) = ĉi(o`), and the smallest integer
r ∈ [m] such that or ≥ ui and ci(or) = ĉi(or). If ` = r, then we output o` = or. Otherwise, there is a
unique α ∈ (0, 1) such that randomizing between o` and or gives expectation α ·o`+(1−α) ·or = ui.
The convex envelope is linear between ol and or, and hence α · ci(o`) + (1 − α) · ci(or) = ĉi(ui).
Then, we can set M(i) to o` with probability α and to or with probability (1−α). Performing the
above for every type i takes O(mn) time.
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